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Terri Schiavo passed away on March 31, 2005. In the weeks 
leading up to her death, what was once a wrenching personal 
matter for Ms. Schiavo's family and loved ones transformed into 
a political and legal drama that gripped much of the nation and 
garnered attention around the world. There was much about Ms. 
Schiavo's case to sadden any of us, regardless of one's political 
or religious views. Everyone should be troubled, however, by the 
fact that virtually all members of the legislative, executive and 
judicial branches involved in enacting or applying the "Act for 
the relief of the parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo" (also re-
ferred to as "Terri's Law")1 seemingly ignored serious questions 
about the law's constitutionality, and in so doing avoided their 
responsibilities as constitutional interpreters. 
Constitutional interpretation by the legislative and execu-
tive branches has been the subject of robust discussion by aca-
demicians and other commentators in recent years.2 Some (my-
self included) have urged non-judicial actors to take more 
seriously their roles as interpreters of the Constitution and in 
dialogue about its meaning and application.3 For us, this aspect 
of the Schiavo matter should have been disheartening. That the 
judiciary seemingly joined in the avoidance of hard constitu-
tional questions is all the more disappointing. 
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Legislators and executive branch officers take oaths to "sup-
port" the Constitution,4 while the President swears to "preserve, 
protect and defend" the Constitution.5 As I have argued else-
where, at a minimum these pledges obligate officials to consider 
for themselves the meaning of the Constitution and its connec-
tion to their work, not simply rely on the judiciary.6 
In Congress's haste to pass Terri's Law, it gave remarkably 
little consideration to whether the legislation was consistent with 
various constitutional provisions and principles. The law pro-
vides: 
The United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Florida shall have jurisdiction to hear, determine and render 
judgment on a suit or claim by or on behalf of Theresa Marie 
Schiavo for the alleged violation of any right of Theresa 
Marie Schiavo under the Constitution or laws of the United 
States relating to the withdrawing or withholdin~ of food, flu-
ids, or mental treatment necessary to sustain life. 
The Senate undertook no substantive evaluation of the law, 
and passed it without debate after behind the scenes wrangling 
over the provisions of the bill.8 A review of the Congressional 
Record memorializing House deliberation reveals but a few 
terse references to the legislation's constitutionality, and most of 
those were by opponents of the bill. The only remotely substan-
tive attention paid to constitutional issues appears in what is de-
scribed as a "su;>plemental legislative history" offered by James 
Sensenbrenner, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, 
4. See U.S. CoNST. art. VI,§ 3. 
5. See U.S. CoNST. art. II,§ 1, cl. 8. 
6. See Gant, supra note 2, at 422 n.297; Bruce G. Peabody & Scott E. Gant, The 
Twice and Future President: Constitutional Interstices and the Twenty-Second Amend-
ment, 83 MINN. L. REv. 565, 627 n.261 (1999); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Con-
stitution of Necessity, 79 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1257, 1262 (2004) ("[I]f any clause of the 
Constitution fairly could be construed as vesting a power of constitutional interpretive 
supremacy ... in any one branch, the Presidential Oath Qause has the best claim to hav-
ing made such an assignment; and that assignment appears to be to the President, not the 
judiciary."); Robert F. Blomquist, The Presidential Oath, The American National Interest 
and A Call for Presiprudence, 73 UMKC L. REv. 1 (2004) (discussing the history, mean-
ing and implications of the Presidential Oath). 
7. Supra note 1, § 1. The final stage of the legal case regarding Ms. Schiavo com-
menced with Congress's passage of Terri's Law, after a voice vote in the Senate, and a 
hurriedly convened, Sunday evening session of the House of Representatives. President 
Bush signed the bill into law after being awakened by aides in the early morning hours on 
March 21, 2005. 
8. Senator Wyden predicted that the Supreme Court would lind the law unconsti-
tutional. See 151 Cong. Rec. S2928 (2005). 
9. See 151 Cong. Rec. H1703 (2005). 
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who argued that the bill is consistent with Supreme Court prece-
dent because it does not "'reopen [] (or direct [] the reopening 
of) final judgments in a whole class of cases [or] in a particular 
suit,"'10 and "presents no problems regarding retrospective appli-
cation."11 Congressman Sensenbrenner did not address any of 
the other potential constitutional objections to the law, nor does 
it appear those were given consideration by others in Congress.12 
Despite the unusual nature of Terri's Law and the circum-
stances of its enactment, the statement released by the President 
immediately after he sitgied the bill mentioned nothing about 
the constitutional issues, 3 and no White House officials offered 
public comment on the constitutionality of the new law. Al-
though it is impossible to know what discussions occurred in the 
West Wing before the President signed it, there is no indication 
that the President or those who advise him evaluated any of the 
difficult constitutional questions raised by Terri's Law. The De-
partment of Justice compounded the President's silence by sub-
mitting a "Statement of Interest" brief to the federal district 
court in support of Ms. Schiavo's parents which asserted that 
Terri's Law "confers jurisdiction" on the district court without 
acknowledging any of the constitutional issues (or explaining 
why the law does not run afoul of the Constitution). 
Unfortunately, the track record of legislative and executive 
branch participation in dialogue about constitutional meaning is 
10. Id. (quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,227 (1995)). 
11. Supra note 9 (relying on Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 269-70 
(1994) and contending that Terri's Law merely effects a change of tribunal to federal 
court rather than creates new legal consequences for events before its enactment). 
12. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to analyze and offer conclusions 
about whether Terri's Law is constitutional, there are a number of potential infirmities 
that warrant consideration, including those related to the Tenth Amendment/federalism 
principles, separation of powers, the equal protection clause, prohibitions against bills of 
attainder and ex post facto laws, and interference with the right to refuse unwanted 
medical treatment (see, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)). 
13. See President's Statement on S. 686, Allowing Federal Courts to Hear the Claim 
of Terri Schiavo (Mar. 21, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2005/03/20050321.html. Among articles generally discussing non-judicial interpretation of 
the Constitution, several specifically address presidential and executive branch obliga-
tions and performance as interpreters of the Constitution. See, e.g., J. Richard 
Broughton, Rethinking the Presidential Veto, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 91 (2005); Cornelia 
T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. 
L. REv. 676 (2005) (discussing constitutional interpretation by the Department of Jus-
tice's Office of the Solicitor General and Office of Legal Counsel); Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. 
L.J. 217 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Protestantism and Comparative Competence, 83 
GEO. L.J. 385 (1994). 
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uneven, at best.14 As a predictive matter, it is not surprising that 
the task of evaluating the constitutionality of Terri's Law was 
passed to the courts with little more than a scintilla of serious de-
liberation.15 Nevertheless, we might have hoped that the extraor-
dinary nature of Terri's Law would have prompted extra vigi-
lance in ensuring adherence to the Constitution.1 
More surprising, however, is that the habit of avoiding con-
stitutional scrutiny seems to have afflicted the judiciary as well in 
this case. In response to the motion for a temporary restraining 
order and injunctive relief filed by Ms. Schiavo's parents hours 
after the President signed Terri's Law, attorneys for Michael 
Schiavo challenged the statute's constitutionality on a number of 
grounds (including that it violated the due process and equal 
protection clauses as well as the Tenth Amendment, and that 
Congress exceeded it powers under the Constitution in enacting 
the law).17 Despite these arguments, and despite noting "there 
may be substantial issues concerning the constitutionality of the 
Act," the district court simply presumed the statute constitu-
tional and proceeded to address the merits of the request.18 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit panel reviewing the district 
court's denial of a temporary restraining order and preliminary 
injunction noted Mr. Schiavo's claim that Terri's Law was un-
constitutional, but like the district court assumed the issue away, 
explaining that "[f]or purposes of determining whether tempo-
rary or preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate, we indulge 
the usual Rresumption that congressional enactments are consti-
tutional." 
The two cases relied on by the courts in explaining their de-
cisions merely to assume the statute's constitutionality and ad-
dress the merits of the motion, without evaluating their jurisdic-
14. See Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Constitutional Interpretation and the 
Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry Into Legislative Attitudes, 1959-2001, 29 LAW & Soc. 
INQUIRY 127 (2004); see also supra notes 2, 13. 
15. Justice Scalia is reported to have observed that "Congress is increasingly abdi-
cating its independent responsibility to be sure that it is being faithful to the Constitu-
tion." See Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Tipping Point, 32 NAT'LJ. 1810, 1811 (2000). 
16. It is ironic that many critics of the judiciary seemingly have passed up many of 
their own opportunities for constitutional analysis and interpretation. 
17. See Opposition Brief to Motion for Injunction, Schiavo ex. rei. Schindler v. 
Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (No. 8:05-CV-530-T-27TBM), available at 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocsldocslschiavo/hus32105opp.pdf. 
18. Schiavo ex. rei. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1382-83 (M.D. Fla. 
2005). 
19. Schiavo ex rei. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2005). 
2005] CONSTITUTIONAL A VOIDANCE 501 
tion, hardly support their approach.20 One was the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's decision in a case called Benning v. Georgia21 (which was 
the sole case cited by the district court when stating it would pre-
sume the statute constitutional), and the other the Supreme 
Court's opinion in United States v. Morrison.22 While both cases 
(and others) note that respect for a coordinate branch of gov-
ernment requires the federal courts to presume, as a starting 
point, that Congress has acted with constitutional authority, nei-
ther case involved the application of that presumption to a re-
quest for an injunction or to constitutional challenges to the 
court's jurisdiction, let alone mandates that the constitutionality 
of a statute purportedly conferring jurisdiction on the court be 
presumed rather than decided. In fact, in each of the two cases 
the court went on to resolve the constitutional issues raised by 
the litigants immediately after referencing this supposed "pre-
sumption," and in Morrison, notwithstanding the presumption, 
the Court found that Congress had exceeded its authority under 
the Constitution.23 
Moreover, substituting a presumption of jurisdiction for 
evaluation of the issue is inconsistent with the Eleventh Circuit's 
own case law. For instance, that court has cited the Supreme 
Court's observation that "'fi]urisdiction is the power to declare 
law .... [I]f there is no jurisdiction there is no authority to sit in 
judgment of anything else. "'24 It has similarly observed that: 
"'[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess 
only that power authorized by the Constitution and statute.' ... 
It follows from this principle of limited jurisdiction that a federal 
court has an independent obligation to review its authority to 
hear a case before it proceeds to the merits."25 Because federal 
20. See id. 
21. 391 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2004). 
22. 529 u.s. 598 (2000). 
23. See Benning, 391 F.3d at 1304 (assessing constitutionality of Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 6fJ7-27 (finding Congress 
lacked power to enact 42 U.S.C. § 13981, which provided a federal civil remedy for the 
victims of gender-motivated violence). Given Congress's performance as a constitutional 
interpreter, the propriety of any such presumption may be called into question. See Note, 
Should the Supreme Coun Presume That Congress Acts Constitutionally? The Role of the 
Canon of Avoidance and Reliance on Early Legislative Practice in Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1798 (2003) (questioning validity of the presumption). 
24. Allapatah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 362 F.3d 739, 754 (11th Cir. 2004) (quot· 
ing Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States, 529 U.S. 765,778 (2000)) (empha-
sis added). 
25. Mirage Resorts, Inc. v. Quiet Nacelle Corp., 206 F.3d 1398, 1400-01 (11th Cir. 
2000) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Ufe Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)) 
(emphasis added); see also Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 292 F.3d 1334, 
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courts have limited jurisdiction they "are obligated to inquire 
into subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be 
lacking,"26 and to do so at any stage in a proceeding, at both the 
trial and appellate levels.27 These principles apply to requests for 
preliminary injunctions,28 just as in any other context. They are 
also consistent with the Supreme Court's rejection of the doc-
trine of "hypothetical jurisdiction," under which some courts had 
proceeded to address merits issues despite jurisdictional objec-
tions.29 
Despite their obligations to consider the constitutional is-
sues presented by Terri's Law (particularly in light of the argu-
ment raised by Mr. Schiavo's lawyers), the district court and the 
twelve active members of the Eleventh Circuit entirely refrained 
1336 (11th Cir. 2002) ("As always, jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry that we are required 
to consider before addressing the merits of any claim."); Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 
1365, 1366 (11th Cir. 1994) ("[A] court must first determine whether it has proper subject 
matter jurisdiction before addressing the substantive issues."). This precept has governed 
the Eleventh Circuit since its inception in 1981, when the former Fifth Circuit was subdi-
vided into a "new Fifth" Orcuit and the Eleventh Orcuit, at which time the Eleventh 
Circuit adopted then-existing Fifth Orcuit law as its own established precedent. See 
Bonner v. Oty of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (adopting Fifth Circuit deci-
sions as precedent); Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654, 663 n.9 (5th Cir. 1979) 
("Federal courts must have both subject matter and [personal] jurisdiction before they 
may act."); Opelika Nursing Home, Inc. v. Richardson, 448 F.2d 658, 667 (5th Cir. 1971) 
("In the federal tandem jurisdiction takes precedence over the merits. Unless and until 
jurisdiction is found, both appellate and trial courts should eschew substantive adjudica-
tion."). 
26. Galindo-Dei Valle v. Att'y Gen., 213 F.3d 594,599 n.2 (11th Or. 2000); see also 
Mirage Resorts, 206 F.3d at 1401. The only presumption regarding federal jurisdiction is 
one against it. See McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178 
(1936). 
27. See FED. R. OV. P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties 
or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss 
the action."); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (raising objec-
tion to federal court jurisdiction). 
28. See, e.g., Labat-Anderson, Inc. v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 2d 145, 149 
(D.D.C. 2004) ("the Court must address the jurisdictional issues first, and may reach the 
merits of the motion for preliminary injunction only once, and only if, jurisdiction is es-
tablished"). Here, the existence of jurisdiction turned entirely on the constitutionality of 
the statute, and did not depend on any facts related to the claims of the parties. Yet even 
in cases where the existence of jurisdiction depends on facts yet-to-be-adjudicated in the 
litigation, courts are required when confronted with a preliminary injunction motion to 
assess the existence of jurisdiction before deciding the merits of the motion. See, e.g., 
Majd-Pour v. Georgiana Community Hosp., Inc., 724 F.2d 901, 902 (11th Cir. 1984); see 
also KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269, 278 (1936) (motion to dismiss based in 
part on the contention that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, filed after request for pre-
liminary injunction, "required the trial court to inquire as to its jurisdiction before con-
sidering the merits of the prayer for preliminary injunction"). 
29. See Steel Co. v. Qtizens For A Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83,94 (1998) (not-
ing rejection of the doctrine "should come as no surprise, since it is reflected in a long 
and venerable line of O cases" and quoting Ex Parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1868), 
as stating '"[w]ithout jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause"'). 
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from addressing any aspect of the statute's constitutionality until 
the final denial of en bane review by the court of appeals on 
March 30, 2005.30 Concurring in that denial, Judge Birch wrote 
separately to express his view that the statute was unconstitu-
tional because it violated separation of powers principles.31 He 
also observed that "[s]ince the passage of [the Act] its constitu-
tionality has been presumed" and seemingly questioned that ap-
proach, contending that jurisdiction "is a prerequisite to the le-
gitimate exercise of judicial power," and that the court "may not 
hypothetically assume jurisdiction to avoid resolving hard juris-
dictional questions. "32 Judge Birch was exactly right in asserting 
(albeit belatedly)33 that jurisdiction cannot be presumed while 
courts address merits issues. In this case, avoidance of the juris-
dictional question was, at its core, avoidance of a serious consti-
tutional question, already largely sidestepped by the legislative 
and executive branches when enacting the law.34 
30. See 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (denying motion for temporary re-
straining order); 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (denying amended motion for 
temporary restraining order); 403 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2005) (denying petition for injunc-
tive relief); 403 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2005) (denying request for rehearing en bane); 403 
F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of amended motion for temporary restrain-
ing order); 404 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2005) (denying request for rehearing en bane). 
31. 404 F.3d at 1271-76. Judge Birch concluded that certain of the Act's provisions 
"constitute legislative dictation of how a federal court should exercise its judicial func-
tions" thereby invading the province of the judiciary and violating separation of powers, 
and that the offending provisions were not severable from the rest of the Act, rendering 
the "entire Act a nullity." ld. at 1274-75. The two dissenting judges-Tjotlat and Wil-
son-disputed Judge Birch's separation of powers analysis, but did not address other po-
tential arguments that the statute is unconstitutional. I d. at 1279-82. 
32. 404 F.3d at 1272. 
33. Regarding the timing of his statements about jurisdiction and the constitutional-
ity of the statute, Judge Birch wrote: "[g]iven the rapid developments and sensitivities in 
this case, the need for deliberate study necessitated the delay in my questioning our ju-
risdiction." 404 F.3d at 1271 n.l. 
34. The district court and Eleventh Circuit conceivably could have tried to rely on 
United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947), as a basis for 
their having reached the merits of the request for a temporary restraining order and in-
junction before having addressing the question of their own jurisdiction. United Mine 
Workers is sometimes cited for the proposition that "a trial court can issue a temporary 
restraining order to maintain the status quo while it is determining its authority to act 
further in the case." Wright & Miller: Federal Practice and Procedure § 3537 at 543; see 
also United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 293 ("In the case before us, the District Court had 
the power to preserve existing conditions while it was determining its own authority to 
grant injunctive relief'). It is not obvious, however, that the decision still stands as au-
thority for that categorical proposition, if it ever did. The case involved an appeal from a 
finding of criminal contempt, where the defendant violated a temporary restraining order 
it claimed the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue. In an opinion without a majority, the 
Supreme Court found the trial court had jurisdiction to issue the restraining order, and 
affirmed the contempt determination on that and other grounds. In subsequent cases, the 
Court has described the power of courts to act prior to determining their jurisdiction in 
narrower terms. See, e.g., United States Catholic Conf. v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, 
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The federal courts addressing the claims of Ms. Schiavo's 
parents brought under Terri's Law commendably acted with dis-
patch, despite being placed under immense political and tempo-
ral pressure. Yet the understandable desire to operate with 
speed cannot trump the court's obligation to ensure it has au-
thority to act. The statute's constitutionality should have been 
addressed by the courts in the first instance, even if that caused 
minor delays in rendering rulings compared with the speed with 
which they acted when assuming the law was constitutional.35 
Both the district court and the court of appeals punted the dicey 
constitutional issue created by this extraordinary law. And they 
continued to avert the issue entirely, until almost the very end of 
this legal drama. Without necessarily endorsing Judge Birch's 
specific separation of powers analysis or his conclusion about the 
law's constitutionality, we should all applaud his having ad-
dressed the issue, even if a little late. 
The issues regarding the constitutionality of Terri's Law cer-
tainly are not easy or clear cut. But that is precisely why all of 
those who had the opportunity-and the obligation- to address 
those questions should have tackled them directly rather than 
looking past them.36 
Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 79 (1988) (noting "inherent and legitimate authority of the court to is-
sue process and other binding orders ... as necessary for the court to determine and rule 
upon its own jurisdiction, including jurisdiction over the subject matter"). Here, the 
courts' orders were not necessary or related to a determination of jurisdiction, and also 
were not issued to preserve the status quo (since they denied the requests for a tempo-
rary restraining order and injunctive relief), even if such actions were authorized under 
United Mine Workers. Moreover, nothing in United Mine Workers or its progeny au-
thorizes lower courts simply to presume they have jurisdiction while proceeding to ad-
dress merits issues. 
35. The Supreme Court has developed doctrines calling on the federal courts, in 
some circumstances, to avoid deciding constitutional issues when they can be avoided. 
See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 
297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also Thomas Healy, The Rise of 
Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847 (2005); Lisa A. Kloppenberg. 
Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 1003 (1994). Whatever might be said 
about the virtues and vices of these doctrines (one of which is sometimes described as 
"constitutional avoidance"), none appears to apply when the threshold issue of the 
court's jurisdiction depends on a related constitutional question since in that circum-
stance the latter cannot be avoided. My use of that term in the title of this article refers to 
the general practice of sidestepping an obligation to grapple with constitutional issues, 
and is not meant to imply criticism of these doctrines. 
36. It would have been proper (and prudent) for the courts to address the substance 
of the request for an injunction as an alternative holding, even if the court found it lacked 
jurisdiction because the statute was unconstitutional, in the event that a higher court re-
versed the determination regarding jurisdiction. 
